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Abstract
Since the mid-1970s, research shows that less-disadvantaged individuals more frequently access social policy schemes
when compared to their more-disadvantaged counterparts, a phenomenon called the Matthew effect. Through two in-
depth case studies, based on 60 semi-directive interviews, and document analysis, this study aims to more fully under-
stand the mechanisms leading to a Matthew effect in Swiss Vocational Education and Training (VET) programmes for dis-
advantaged youth. Indeed, education is key to post-industrial labour markets access, and VET appears to facilitate school-
to-work transitions. A Matthew effect in this policy field might thus lead to particularly detrimental repercussions, and
public authorities should be especially eager to contain it. Nevertheless, findings show that, under certain conditions,
decision-makers push frontline-workers into cream-skimming practices, causing a Matthew effect. Additionally, structural
challenges also lead to aMatthew effect, highlighting the general difficulty of the very mandate: (re-)inserting highly disad-
vantaged individuals into selective markets. Indeed, in contexts of tight public budgets, service oriented modern Welfare
States tread a fine line between empowering and prioritising beneficiaries. Dealing with complex target groups, it seems
crucial whether the rationale driving public authorities is more oriented towards credit-claiming or problem-solving: the
former increasing and the latter decreasing the incidence of Matthew effects.
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1. Introduction
More than four decades have lapsed since 1975 when
Herman Deleeck introduced the notion of a Matthew
effect in social policy research. This concept describes
a situation in which the least-disadvantaged individuals
among a targeted group are more able to benefit from
social policy schemes than their more-disadvantaged
counterparts. Thus, it allows for a depiction of the var-
ious means in which social policy particularly favours
upper social-classes (Deleeck, 1979) or, more generally,
less-disadvantaged individuals among a target group. As
within-country disparities have increased over the last
years, this principle remains an interesting object of
study. Recent research in social policy also highlighted
the existence of aMatthew effect in interventions aimed
at facilitating labour market participation, particularly
focusing on access to childcare services (e.g., Bonoli &
Champion, 2015; van Lancker &Ghysels, 2012), or on the
broader functioning of the social investment approach
(Bonoli, Cantillon, & van Lancker, 2017; Cantillon, 2011).
Needless to say, a Matthew effect can significantly im-
pact the life-chances of the most vulnerable individuals,
while affecting public finances due to higher social expen-
ditures and forgone public revenue. Therefore, it is in the
interest of public policy to contain it as much as possible.
As education has become a crucial asset for labour
market integration in modern knowledge societies, it is
particularly important to limit a Matthew effect in this
policy field. Indeed, structural changes such as tertiari-
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sation, technological evolution and globalisation have
driven post-industrial economies towards an increasingly
skilled workforce (e.g., Bonoli, 2013). Young adults lack-
ing post-compulsory education are a particularly vulner-
able group, facing great employment difficulties and a
high risk of poverty (López Vilapana, 2013). Moreover,
long unemployment spells at a young age can leave long-
lasting scarring effects (e.g., Bell & Blanchflower, 2010).
Consequently, rapid youth integration into labour mar-
kets is crucial, and post-compulsory education seems a
promising avenue for increased chances on the labour
market. Vocational Education and Training (VET) systems,
in particular dual-VET, which combines in-school theoret-
ical education with on-the-job practical training (appren-
ticeships and dual-VET are used interchangeably), are
often praised for facilitating school-to-work transitions
(e.g., Salvisberg & Sacchi, 2014; Stalder, 2012). Political
efforts to support VET integration are therefore an im-
portant tool to increase disadvantaged youth’s chances
on the labour market. Yet, it is crucial that they man-
age to reach out to the most-disadvantaged youth, as
dual-VET access is generally challenging, and the more-
disadvantaged face greater access difficulties (e.g., Häfeli
& Schellenberg, 2009).
A Matthew effect in dual-VET programmes for dis-
advantaged youth might therefore be particularly detri-
mental, leading to long-term repercussions on individ-
ual well-being and on welfare states, further marginalis-
ing already highly vulnerable persons. Previous studies
focused e.g., on a French social integration programme
for disadvantaged youth (Gomel, Issehnane, & Legendre,
2013), on VET programmes in Belgium (Nicaise, 2000),
or on training and employment programmes for dis-
advantaged individuals (Nicaise & Bollens, 1998). The
present research differs from those studies by focus-
ing on a Matthew effect in dual-VET programmes for
disadvantaged youth. The rather narrow focus pursued
in this study is due to its presumed integration poten-
tial and consequent political salience. Given dual-VET’s
strength in facilitating school-to-work transitions, such
programmes presumably result in more opportunities
for youth labour market integration—while training is
a broad term, inclusive of diverse activities (e.g., lan-
guage or computer courses) and yielding highly diverse
impacts, dual-VET programmes are highly specific and
fairly rare among activation policies. Moreover, given
the risk of substantial repercussions on public finances
through failed youth labourmarket integration,Matthew
effect containment in this policy field should be particu-
larly relevant to policy makers. Yet, difficult dual-VET ac-
cessibility for disadvantaged youth implies that some de-
gree of a Matthew effect is likely present. Against this
backdrop, this article is guided by questions of why and
how aMatthew effect occurs in training programmes for
disadvantaged youth. This research aims to contribute to
the understanding of theMatthew effect through a holis-
tic investigation of the contributing mechanisms in two
Swiss dual-VET programmes.
The article is structured as follows. First, background
information and research approach are introduced (Sec-
tion 2). Second, the analytic lens is presented, highlight-
ing key actors and crucial systems affecting access to the
studied measures (Section 3). Third, a synthesis of re-
sults is explained, then illustrated through relevant ex-
cerpts from the empirical data (Section 4). This section
is divided according to the two detected mechanisms
leading to a Matthew effect in the studied cases: as a
consequence of the political mandate (Section 4.2.1),
and due to cream-skimming incentive structures for
frontline workers (Section 4.2.2). Discussion and conclu-
sion follow.
2. Background and Research Approach
Switzerland offers interesting research opportunities for
investigating the different mechanisms leading to a
Matthew effect in youth VET programmes. The federal
structure and a generally high degree of local discretion
lead to a variety of programmes embedded in cantonal
contexts, while the general reference to the VET system,
of federal competence, is nationally uniform. Dual-VET
is quite popular in Switzerland: annually, two-thirds of
youth opt for a VET upper-secondary education, with
a majority opting for dual-VET (Staatssekretariat für Bil-
dung, Forschung und Innovation [SBFI], 2018, p. 10). The
proximity of dual-VET to labour market requirements, in
terms of skills andworkforce, is often associatedwith the
comparatively low youth unemployment rate in Switzer-
land (SBFI, 2018, p. 4). Indeed, the nationally recognised
VET certificates represent a valuable asset for integration
within the Swiss labour market.
To holistically explore the mechanisms and reasons
engendering a Matthew effect, I rely on two in-depth,
embedded case studies (Yin, 2009/2013, p. 50). Each
case study represents a Swiss cantonal (regional) mea-
sure aimed at increasing disadvantaged youth’s chances
on the labour market by supporting their achievement
of a VET certificate. For each case, the different groups
of key actors represent the units of analysis. Selected rel-
ative to their influence on the odds of youth access to
the measures, these are politico–administrative actors
(designing, steering and managing the policies), front-
line workers (implementing the programmes), the tar-
geted youth (defining the degree of integration diffi-
culty), and other crucial actors relative to each case. The
main data source is a corpus of 60 semi-structured face-
to-face interviews, lasting between 30 and 90 minutes,
with 63 key actors. For the first case 39 interviews with
40 persons were conducted, and for the second (smaller)
case, 21 interviews with 23 persons were conducted. Ta-
ble 1 offers an interview overview, clustered by key ac-
tor group. Analysis of the fully self-transcribed interviews
was performed using MAXQDA, and draws on grounded
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Aiming at fully under-
standing a phenomenon, grounded theory seems partic-
ularly appropriate for the present study. In order to se-
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Table 1. Interviews clustered by group of actors.
Group Of Actors Function (Citation Code) No. Interviews; Function (Citation Code) No. Interviews;
No. Interviewees No. Interviewees
Case 1-Large Francophone Canton Case 2-Small Germanophone Canton
Politico- Cantonal level: 3; 2 High civil servant: 1
Administrative Design and steering Design and steering
Actors (POLADMIN1-CANT-I & II); (POLADMIN2-I)
Municipal level: 3; 2 Support-group members: 6
Local implementation Various actors involved in
management designing the measure,
(POLADMIN-MUN1-I & II) now consultative function
(POLADMIN2-II to VII)
Street-Level Social workers: 10 Professionals working for 4
Bureaucrats Providing social support to the contracted
the youth before accessing organisation, participating
the programme to design and steering
(SLB-SW1-I to X) (SLB2-I to IV)
SIM workers: 11; 14
Socio-professional
(re)integration experts,
contracted to support youth
to find a solution
(SLB-SIM1-I to XIV)
(Potential) Policy 18-25-year-olds at the benefit 10* 15–24-year-olds risking to 2
Recipients of social assistance, without fail post-compulsory
accomplished post- education transition due
compulsory education, to multiple problematics,
enrolled in a SIM enrolled in the measure
(YOUTH1-I to X) (YOUTH2-I & II)
Others Member of the organisation 2 Professionals of 8; 10
accompanying the youth institutions entitled to
enrolled in the programme announce youth
(ADD1-I) (ADD2-I to VIII)
Employee of a municipal
specialised insertion unit
(ADD1-II)
Total 39; 40 21; 23
Note: * Including a 17-year-old, thus ineligible for social assistance.
lect the data useful to holistically understand the phe-
nomenon, different analytical rounds aim to progres-
sively lead the analysis to a higher theoretical abstrac-
tion from the empirical data: in a first round of coding
(open coding), relevant segments of data are labelled;
in a second one (axial coding), the codes are placed in
relationship with one another; in the last round (selec-
tive coding), code categories are identified on the basis
of clustered codes (Braun & Clarke, 2013, pp. 211, 214).
Desk research of primary and secondary sources comple-
ments the interviews.
Generally, the aim was to reconstruct the mecha-
nisms leading to a Matthew effect through a ‘backward
mapping’ approach: first identifying where a Matthew
effect occurs, then reconstructing the rationale under-
lying the Matthew-effect-inducing strategies. Questions
varied between group and stage of the research. Inter-
views investigated, for instance, the policy design defini-
tion and rationale (politico–administrative actors), work-
ing strategies and challenges (frontline workers) and the
difficulties of finding an apprenticeship post (youth). To
identify aMatthew effect, criteria determining restricted
programme access, as derived from interviews and docu-
ment analysis, were compared to the notion of disadvan-
tage. If the information was corresponding, a Matthew
effect was identified. Since the focus of the study is to
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identify the underlying mechanisms to, and not whether
there is a Matthew effect, a precise measure of the ef-
fect, barely possible, is not crucial. The concept of dis-
advantage employed in this research is relative to dual-
VET access, since this is determinant to access both pro-
grammes. This draws on both relevant literature (see Sec-
tion 3) and interviewee accounts, in order to address lo-
cal peculiarities.
The first case, implemented in a large French-
speaking canton, targets young adults (18–25-year-olds)
benefiting from social assistance, who have not com-
pleted upper-secondary education (for a more in-depth
analysis of this case see Pisoni, in press). This is a unique
programme resulting from local discretion, as social as-
sistance is a cantonal competence in Switzerland. To en-
hance labour market (re-)integration, the programme of-
fers individualised support throughout apprenticeship,
and a scholarship covering training and living expenses.
To be eligible, youth from the target group need to have
found a training opportunity. Several Social Insertion
Measures (SIMs) have been contracted to support them
in this search. SIMs are mainly non-profit organisations
mandated to help these youth to find amid- to long-term
solution, with preference for an apprenticeship.
The second case is a federally initiated programme
intended to enhance the number of youth completing
upper-secondary education. The central government is-
sued broad guidelines, and financed the initial phase,
followed by a regressive financing model with cantons
eventually assuming the financial burden. Since imple-
mentation was cantonal and voluntary, cantonal pro-
grammes developed in different directions. The selected
measure, implemented in a small, affluent Swiss-German
canton, aims to support youth (15–24-year-olds) at risk
of failing the post-compulsory-school transition due to
multiple difficulties. It offers an individualised support
throughout this transition and throughout VET. To avoid
a revolving-door effect—that is, a fragmented treatment
according to agencies’ tasks instead of appropriate holis-
tic support—a reference person refers youth to existing
support options in order to treat the multiple problem-
atics as a combination of measures, rather than treating
problems separately. Eligibility is based on youth’s inten-
tion, and capability of pursuing VET. Youth need to get an-
nounced through an institution (e.g., schools, unemploy-
ment office, social assistance). Implementation is dele-
gated to a private association, framed as a public-private-
partnership.
Selection of the first case was based on the assump-
tion of a Matthew effect through comparison of low ac-
cess rates (ca. 20%) to the high success rate (65%1). It was
presumed that the less-disadvantaged youth among the
target group primarily access the programme. This made
it an excellent case to explore the dynamics which lead
to a Matthew effect. The second case was selected due
to its similar objective, yet different cantonal context: dif-
ferent management arrangements, and a more dynamic
apprenticeship market,2 potentially lowering the access
threshold for the most-disadvantaged youth. With ac-
cess rates around 78% (2009–2017), and success rates
around 47%3 (2010–2017), tendency towards aMatthew
effect is less apparent.
3. Accompanying Disadvantaged Youth to Integrate a
Selective Market
The organisational field and Street-Level Bureaucracy
emerged as a useful theoretical framework, as empir-
ical insights quickly highlighted the importance of ac-
tors’ behaviours, substantially shaped by pressures orig-
inating from the organisational and broader contextual
framework. Combining strategic analysis of organisa-
tions (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977/2014), and Street-Level
Bureaucracy theory (Lipsky, 1980/2010) offers a particu-
larly relevant analytic lens for the present study, as both
theories aim at exploring and highlighting the role and di-
versity of informal norms and practices in public organi-
sations (Buffat, 2016, p. 159), approaching the issue from
different angles.While strategic analysis of organisations
focuses on the interaction between the relevant groups
of key actors as well as between actors and the system(s)
steering their actions, Street-Level Bureaucracy zooms in
on frontline workers, emphasising structural constraints
and challenges stemming from their working conditions
(Brodkin, 2012, pp. 941–942).
According to strategic analysis of organisations, in
a collective action context, actors’ strategies are mainly
constrained by two factors: first, the behaviour of other
actors participating in the collective action, and second,
the systems delimiting actors’ behavioural options. Ra-
tionality, indeed, might not be evident nor necessar-
ily conscious or intentional, but always makes sense in
context and in function of other actors’ ‘moves’ (Am-
blard, Bernoux, Herreros, & Livian, 1996/2005, p. 23).
Relative to the studied cases, interviewee groups de-
note groups of key actors. In terms of systems, ac-
tors’ behaviour in both cases seem shaped by dual-VET
and by the politico-administrative framework. Relative
to the former, the apprenticeship offer in Switzerland
relies on the economy (Häfeli & Schellenberg, 2009):
employers are free to choose whether and whom to
train. Since employers must comply with market prin-
ciples, they generally try to contain training costs by
selecting most trainable youth (Di Stasio, 2014). The
allocation of apprenticeships, therefore, relies substan-
tially onmarket principles comprehending inherent com-
petition and selection logics. Consequently, integration
into dual-VET markets is challenging for many youth,
1 Youth succeeding throughout apprenticeship. Success rate at the final exam is similar to the overall cantonal rate (80%).
2 Dual-VET ismore entrenched in German-speaking than Latin Switzerland.Moreover, it strongly depends on labourmarkets, thus, in economically strong
contexts, dual-VET is also more dynamic.
3 42% accomplished VET; 5% of cases were ended prematurely because support was no longer needed.
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more so for disadvantaged ones. The literature high-
lights several factors influencing apprenticeship market
opportunities. On the individual level, crucial features in-
clude cognitive and soft-skills; compulsory-school class-
track;4 socio-economic and migration background; na-
tionality; informal networks; working virtues and gender
(Camilleri-Cassar, 2013; Di Stasio, 2014; Häfeli & Schel-
lenberg, 2009; Hupka & Stalder, 2004; Liebig, Kohls, &
Krause, 2012; Meyer, 2009; Perriard, 2005; Protsch &
Solga, 2015; Solga, 2015). Meeting apprenticeship mar-
ket requirements when struggling with compound prob-
lematics might be particularly challenging. Indeed, peo-
ple in ‘complex needs’ situations face multiple inter-
locking problematics, spanning from health to social is-
sues. This term addresses both breadth and depth of
needs, i.e., variety and severity of needs (Rankin & Re-
gan, 2004, pp. 7–8). The way the studied programmes
address youth’s complex needs in order to help them in-
tegrate into the dual-VET market is a determinant of a
Matthew effect incidence.
The politico–administrative framework is generally
shaped by a context of ‘permanent austerity’ (Bonoli,
2013, p. 3), inducing cost-containment attempts. It com-
prehends two components: activation policies and public
management. From an administrative perspective, the
first case adheres to New Public Management (NPM)
principles, while the second, post-NPM. NPM gener-
ally aims to improve public sector effectiveness and
efficiency, reducing public expenditures and improv-
ing managerial accountability (Christensen & Laegreid,
2011/2013, p. 1). Performance management and out-
put are key elements (Jun, 2009, p. 162). It also pro-
motes contractualism, emphasizing well-defined, short,
fixed-term contracts, with monetary incentives (Boston,
2011/2013, pp. 20–21). The first case contains several
NPM features: governance is highly verticalised, with
substantial distance between the principal—politico-
administrative powers defining the policy design—and
agents—lower administrative levels in charge of imple-
menting (aspects of) the policy. Moreover, public au-
thorities contracted several SIMs for the delivery of well-
specified outputs. Accountability and assessment are
result-based: contracts are annually renegotiated on the
basis of a predetermined success rate.
Post-NPM pursues a more holistic strategy, relying
on insights also from other social sciences, instead of a
pure economic vision. It pursues better usage of scarce
resources by creating synergies “bringing together dif-
ferent stakeholders in a particular policy area and to
offer citizens seamless rather than fragmented access
to services” (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007/2009, p. 10).
Instead of quasi-market forces, it emphasises network-
based self-regulation (Dent, 2005, p. 632), coordina-
tion, cooperation, clearly-defined role relationships and
public-private-partnerships (Jun, 2009, p. 163). The sec-
ond case follows post-NPMprinciples: implementation is
delegated to a single organisation, already active in sup-
porting disadvantaged youth during apprenticeship, in
the formof a public-private-partnership. A support group
composed of key actors from municipal schools and can-
tonal offices involved with youth was appositely created
to buttress the organisation. Accountability and assess-
ment are process-based, relying on the number of en-
rolled youth. The annually negotiated partnership deter-
mines how many youth will be financed by the cantonal
department in the following year.
From a political perspective, both programmes are
activation policies with a social investment approach: to
activate youth on the labour market by investing in their
education and training. Indeed, modern welfare states
increasingly focus on activating beneficiaries, along with
the more traditional task of securing income, aiming
to (re-)insert benefit claimants into the labour market
through various strategies. To meet increasing skill re-
quirements of knowledge economies, social investment
strategy aims to invest in people’s human capital. Amore
individualised service resulting from activation policies
sounds promising for responding to the challenge of sup-
porting persons with complex needs. However, the fo-
cus on activating beneficiaries comes with an emphasis
on their responsibility. In exchange for benefits, bene-
ficiaries must satisfy certain activation principles. This
can have an empowering effect, but it also “makes ac-
cess to welfare benefits more constraining and selective”
(Dif-Pradalier, Rosenstein, & Bonvin, 2012, p. 1). The in-
creased selectivity and emphasis on self-responsibility
may make it particularly hard for persons struggling with
complex needs to comply with activation expectations.
As social policy is increasingly service orientated,
the quality of the accompaniment beneficiaries receive
highly depends on frontline practices. In Lipsky’s terms,
the way public policy reaches the population, affecting
people’s lives, is strongly influenced by how frontline
workers transform policies into practice. Thus, Lipsky’s
analytic framework leads to a more precise understand-
ing of the implications of a particularly crucial group of
actors on a Matthew effect. In constant contact with cit-
izens, and working in situations requiring responses to
human dimensions, Street-Level Bureaucrats (SLBs) en-
joy a certain discretion in executing their jobs (Lipsky,
1980/2010, pp. 3, 15). Accompanying youth with com-
plex needs to (re-)integrate into a selective apprentice-
ship market is an intricate task. The target group is highly
heterogeneous, each individual carrying a unique set of
challenges linked to personal situation and context. It is
therefore crucial that frontline workers are capable of
adapting their working strategies to each individual situa-
tion. Yet, a major dilemma in public services is perpetual
resource scarcity (Lipsky, 1980/2010, pp. 33–39). Con-
sequently, the work structure does not allow frontline
workers to perform the job in its ideal conception (Lipsky,
1980/2010, pp. xi–xii, xvii, 3). To deal with this incapa-
4 In differentiated education systems, pupils are divided into different tracks during lower-secondary education, affecting upper-secondary educa-
tion options.
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bility of best treating each individual case, SLBs, relying
on their discretionary power, may develop coping strate-
gies and working regularities. A strategy for attaining a
manageable workload is to re-categorise and differenti-
ate ‘clients’ in function of the likelihood of their adminis-
trative success, i.e., cream-skimming (Lipsky, 1980/2010,
p. 107). To address the complexity of each individual
situation in a context of scarce resources becomes par-
ticularly challenging. The degree to which SLBs can ex-
tend the quality and individualisation of their support
greatly depends on their working conditions. These con-
ditions are largely determined by politico–administrative
actors through the general design of the policy. Particu-
larly important are the access conditions to a measure,
and frontline worker assessment criteria. The former de-
termines the difficulty for the target group to access a
programme, and the latter shapes the incentive struc-
ture addressed to frontline workers and contributes to
determining the degree of frontline worker discretion.
4. Further Marginalising the Most-Disadvantaged?
In the following sections, the two mechanisms lead-
ing to a Matthew effect are presented: in both cases,
a Matthew effect stems from the political mandate
(Section 4.1); only in the first case do the politico-
administrative rationale and the resulting policy design
again trigger this effect (Section 4.2).
4.1. The Political Mandate
A first Matthew effect is driven by the very mandates of
the two programmes: integrating highly disadvantaged
youth into a selective apprenticeship market. Access to
this market is central in both policies’ eligibility criteria:
having found a training opportunity (first case) or being
motivated and capable of following VET (second case).
Yet, while targeting disadvantaged youth, neither policy
addresses the market’s selective nature. Empirical find-
ings highlight how the youth under consideration are
generally rather distant from that market. According to
several interviewees’ accounts (across different groups),
many youth cumulate several features highlighted by the
literature as hampering VET integration, e.g., migration
background, low class-track, and weak cognitive- and
soft-skills. Additionally, their complex needs may absorb
them to the point of (temporarily) blank out longer-term
plans such as education, as their compound struggles of-
ten result in unstable life situations. Housing problemat-
ics are emblematic to illustrate this: when housing prob-
lematics are present, they become central, making it
particularly difficult to focus on education or training.
Interviewees often cited housing issues in conjunction
with family problematics, which are crucial in both cases.
Evenwhen housing is guaranteed, lack of familial backing
generally leaves youth without support throughout the
delicate transition phase. Another major and increasing
problematic in both cases are health issues: drug use and,
particularly, psychological issues. The lack of a support-
ive home increases the struggle of addressing such prob-
lematics. This succinctly illustrates the interconnection
between different problematics and that, in situations of
complex needs, “the total represents more than the sum
of the component parts” (Rankin & Regan, 2004, p. 7).
Relative to the first case, the following citations illus-
trate how youth’s complex needs hamper their appren-
ticeship market integration, the precondition for pro-
gramme access:
There are youth who start from so low, who face so
many difficulties, that if possible it will be way later,
maybe two, three years later it will be possible to
imagine [their integration]. Because that youthwill be
in hell. (POLADMIN-MUN1-II)
We have rather few youth who are sufficiently ready
to enter an apprenticeship….There are substance
abuse, psychological problems too, which makes
some really take a long time to enter VET. (SLB-SW1-
IV; emphasis added by the author)
The literature further highlighted that people with com-
plex needs “may be ‘defined out’ of the remit of services
because they are assessed as being ‘too complex’ or ‘too
challenging’ for the service” (Rosengard, Laing, Ridley, &
Hunter, 2007, p. 44; see also Nicaise, 2000). Indeed, in
the second case, eligibility criteria based on will and ca-
pacity of following VET excludes themost-disadvantaged
youth from the target group. The following citations illus-
trate this well:
There are some who are not accepted [to the pro-
gramme] because the chances of success are prac-
tically zero…because you cannot suppose that with
a good support they will manage to accomplish an
apprenticeship. (POLADMIN2-V; emphasis added by
the author)
They take on the cases where they see that it’s fine,
they can do something, whereas the very difficult
ones, which are highly complex from the beginning,
those theymaybe have to leave aside for themoment,
because they actually have the mandate—the mea-
sure is relative to VET, not to the general social con-
text…so it’s necessary to delimit it a bit, and that’s also
in the arrangement [with the cantonal department],
that it has to be clearly VET oriented, and that this de-
limitation needs to take place. (POLADMIN2-I; empha-
sis added by the author)
Consequently, the structural difficulty of integration into
the apprenticeship market for the most-disadvantaged
youth leads to better access for less-disadvantaged
youth not only to the apprenticeship market, but also
to the programmes. In both cases, the combination of
the mandate and politically unaddressed structural chal-
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lenges (selectivity of the VET market) induces, therefore,
a Matthew effect.
4.2. Between Credit-Claiming and Problem-Solving
To understand the way frontline workers address indi-
vidual’s complex needs, frontline practices must be anal-
ysed in the light of working conditions. It is particularly
necessary to comprehend the incentive structure steer-
ing their actions. These are largely shaped by the politico-
administrative framework and by the political salience
of the respective policies, defining the rationale under-
lying policy design choices. High political salience and
a governance close to political powers in the first case,
led to an incentive structure predominantly driven by
politico–administrative framework, emphasising activa-
tion and NPM. The underlying rationale in this scenario
tends towards a credit-claiming approach (Section 4.2.1).
With low political salience and governance oriented to-
wards the operative level in the second case, individ-
ual challenges of integrating within the VET systemwere
also highlighted. The underlying rationale in this scenario
tends towards problem-solving (Section 4.2.2). Credit-
claiming rationale resulted in a more restrictive incen-
tive structure focused on clear-cut results, triggering a
Matthew effect. A problem-solving approach allowed
for more levy to SLBs to address individual difficulties,
avoiding a Matthew effect. The following sections illus-
trate the case-specific mechanisms for understanding
whether a Matthew-effect-inducing incentive structure
is present.
4.2.1. Case 1: Credit-Claiming Orientation
The first programme in this article, a flagship policy, was
highly politicised from inception. Broad political support
was crucial to ensure parliament continued to allocate
the necessary, substantial resources. This led to a cream-
skimming-inducing policy design for frontline workers
tasked with helping youth find an apprenticeship (SIM
workers).5 Cream-skimming candidates at the entrance
of the measure increases probability of successful re-
sults, ensuring political support.
Annual SIM contracts with the cantonal department
are renewed based on the achievement of a requested
success rate. Such conditionsmake it difficult to properly
address youth’s complex needs, as the tendency towards
measuring public service outputs “may have detrimental
impact on service willingness to work with clients with
multiple and/or complex needs” (Rosengard et al., 2007,
p. 23). Since formost SIMs the contract with the cantonal
authority is financially vital, they need to complywith the
assessment criteria, even at the expense of their organ-
isational goal, i.e., to support struggling youth. Thus, to
ensure organisational survival by preserving the contract,
SIM workers cream-skim candidates, i.e., invest more re-
sources in the youth already closer to the market. Conse-
quently, a Matthew effect is induced.
In a context driven by an activation focused social
investment approach and NPM principles, clear-cut suc-
cessful results portraying the allocated budget as an in-
vestment into participants’ activation is key to achieving
the necessary political support. In the following citation,
a high-ranking civil servant explains howpolitical support
was initially garnered via a successful pilot project:
The political context was favourable thanks to the re-
sults obtained [from the pilot project], because at the
beginning it wasn’t so favourable, it was like a bet at
the beginning….Then, thanks to these successes, the
right as well as the left has applauded the results
of this programme and since then there is a big uni-
formity concerning the way of interpreting its results
and success, it then didn’t pose problems anymore at
the political level. It really appeared as an investment.
(POLADMIN-CANT1-I; emphasis added by the author)
To ensure the image of efficient resource use in terms of
activation (measured by the number of enrolled youth
succeeding throughout VET) and thus to secure polit-
ical support, one strategy is to select the good risks
at the entrance of the measure, as the following cita-
tions underline:
I think that the force of this programme is that
we don’t enrol someone who we know will fail.
(POLADMIN-MUN1-II)
I think that [the criteria to access the programme] is
really all thosewho are capable to follow and have the
potential. This is why we often say that it is a bit the
cream of our clients who we send to the programme.
Well, it is for all those for whom the problems are
not an obstacle to enter it or to follow it. (POLADMIN-
MUN1-I; emphasis added by the author)
To satisfy the necessity of filtering for low risk candidates,
the policy design embedded an incentive structure induc-
ing frontline workers to cream-skim candidates. The fol-
lowing citation of a high-ranking civil servant shows the
calculation behind this incentive structure:
The preparatory measures are evaluated according to
results. Not according to how they do the job, but ac-
cording to the results they achieve, and this for me is
very important. Because I want them to filter: I prefer
that the youth are reoriented towardsmore adequate
measures, instead of staying here andhave one failure
after another. (POLADMIN-CANT1-I)
Several elements of the incentive structure drive cream-
skimming practices. First, the contract is renewed on the
5 Contracted to perform activities on behalf of government agencies, SIM workers can be considered SLBs despite working for private organisations (see
Smith & Lipsky, 1993, p. 13).
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basis of the satisfaction of a success rate of 50%. Given
the general distance of the youth from the VET market,
it is much easier to achieve this success rate by focus-
ing on the youth already closer to the market. Tellingly,
an increase of the requested success rate from 20% to
50% also increased cream-skimming practices as a SIM
worker states in the following citation:
However, there is also a creaming which is done.
We…hm…it is difficult to say…we try to avoid it on a
day-to-day basis, but it is clear that for instance today
we will faster say, ‘currently it is not yet possible [to
insert this youth], this leads nowhere’. Whereas actu-
ally before, whenwewere still at 20% [of success rate]
we could take more time to accompany the youth to
see if there still is a change which can be done and
so on. But now, we are anyhow constraint, yes it is
clear, actually we say more quickly, ‘well, there, pfff,
it…it won’t happen’. (SLB-SIM1-XI; emphasis stressed
by the speaker)
Particularly relevant in this respect is the following cita-
tion from one of the few SIMs financially independent
from the welfare department and, therefore, not subject
to its assessment criteria:
What might also be interesting is that in our measure,
wewill not be…how to say,measured on resultswith a
percentage of success, so, eeehm, we have quite low-
threshold youth: we do not select the good risks. (SLB-
SIM1-XIV; emphasis added by the author)
Second, the contract is renewed annually. However, the
complexity of the situations for most of these youth are
often not resolved quickly. For a youth to become ‘train-
able’, more urgent problems may need to be initially
addressed. Thus, this time-frame can be restrictive for
readying the most-disadvantaged to (re-)integrate into
the apprenticeship market:
It takes time. Whereas in the programme it should
go fast so that they quit social assistance. But I have
rarely seen that it goes fast actually…because if it
would go fast, they wouldn’t be at social assistance.
(SLB-SW1-V)
Third, some SIMs have direct relationships with employ-
ers. This allows them to better support the youth in ob-
taining an internship or, ideally, an apprenticeship. For
these youth, selection on the basis of their dossier is
difficult. Internships represent a valuable tool for prov-
ing suitability and trainability to employers. Through
these direct relationships, SIMs also play the role of
the youth’s guarantors, encouraging employers to give
them a chance despite less-than-ideal dossiers. However,
these relationships are extremely resource-intensive for
SIMs to build and maintain. Consequently, for preserva-
tion of these essential contacts, SIMs carefully select can-
didates to send to these firms. The most-disadvantaged
youth represent a potential threat to the relationship,
and subsequently benefit less from this resource:
This is what is difficult for us, that sometimes the
youth didn’t show-up or there were issues, so we lost
the link [to the employer]. Recently it happened to
us and it is quite difficult already to get this link and
then all the sudden, hopp! So sometimes we have to
choose according to the type of firm whom we place,
well, choose…is a big word, but to pay attention in or-
der to preserve our contact. (SLB-SIM1-X)
Therefore, the necessity of ensuring political consensus,
in an activation driven social investment and NPM frame-
work, seems to induce goal displacement: emphasis on
supporting youth in overcoming their obstacles to acti-
vation, shifts towards credit-claiming based on youth ac-
tivation results. This results in aMatthew effect-inducing
incentive structure.
4.2.2. Case 2: Problem-Solving Orientation
The second programmewas practically non-politicised be-
cause the appeal for the measure and its initial financ-
ing came through the federal government. When the
canton assumed control of its financing, the programme
had already proven itself and was fully running; sub-
stantial initial investments were not necessary. Indeed,
despite coinciding with a difficult moment in terms of
cantonal finances, the programme was not debated in
parliament, but simply taken over, (though with a re-
stricted budget due to generalised financial cuts). The
minor political salience allowed actors to ignore credit-
claiming ploys, and to retain focus on the core addressed
problem: supporting youth with complex problematics
throughout their transition. The cantonal administration,
the support group, and the contracted organisation con-
jointly defined the policy design. This allowed to keep the
contracted organisation’s goal (to support disadvantaged
youth throughout transition) central during this key phase
and to integrate frontline challenges into the policy design.
Therefore, while activation remains a central goal, work
structures allow the core issue to be better addressed.
The relationship between the organisation and the
cantonal department is based on an annually negoti-
ated agreement between the two parties, determining
the number of youth financed by the canton. The con-
tract is determined by process-based assessment: in-
stead of clear-cut activation-based results, the number
of enrolled youth is most relevant. If these numbers are
less than agreed upon, the cantonal financial contribu-
tion would be revised accordingly, but the partnership is
not interrupted. Given the process assessment, though
the contract is renewed annually, the support offered
to youth is not bound to this time-frame. These working
conditions leave frontline workers much more leeway in
addressing the individual compound difficulties.
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In the following citation a high-ranking civil ser-
vant illustrates the measure’s low political salience, and
how this enables focus on the core problematic rather
than providing clear-cut outputs which are difficult
to measure:
I’m convinced that we don’t have an inexpensive but
a good measure….I simply consider the context and
evaluate the general cantonal situation and I have
to say that it works, and the measure contributes to
this—although I cannot prove how much the mea-
sure contributes to the general good situation, but
it certainly is an important contribution….Of course
it would be difficult if a political questioning would
come: we have to tell the exact output, how would
the situation be if we hadn’t the measure, what
would we lack….Those are difficult questions, but
they don’t come! (POLADMIN2-I; emphasis stressed
by the speaker)
The following two citations illustrate, respectively, front-
line workers’ operational discretion (without perfor-
mance pressures) and their focus on the individual situa-
tion instead of results:
[The cantonal department] does not prescribe us
what we have to do. We are really free. The depart-
ment finances us, but we are really free.
Int.: And you don’t have success expectations or such
prescriptions? Nor pressure in this sense?
No, not at all. (SLB2-II)
I am currently following a young woman…who has
been with us for about 7 years. And...a lot has al-
ready happened there: beginnings, interruptions, be-
ginnings....Now she is in her third apprenticeship year
but it doesn’t really look 100% good. Simply because
of her....She has a child, she has very bad educational
records, and then also her personality, and…simply all
factors…I think she wouldn’t have come that far if she
hadn’t had a reference person supporting her.
Int.: So, this shows that it is really the case, the indi-
vidual result that is targeted?
Yes, you mean that we are client-oriented? We are
only client-oriented. (SLB2-III)
Consequently, in this programme no Matthew-effect-
inducing incentive-structure was identified.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Based on two in-depth embedded case studies of VET
programmes for disadvantaged youth in Switzerland, the
aim of this article was to offer deep insight into mech-
anisms in this policy field which lead to a Matthew ef-
fect, and to contribute to the general understanding of
this phenomenon in social policies. Discerning key ac-
tors’ strategies against the backdrop of systems fram-
ing their possibilities for behaviour, two Matthew-effect-
inducing mechanisms were identified. First, in both
cases, a Matthew effect is induced through the man-
date of activating highly disadvantaged youth in selec-
tive markets, with eligibility criteria focusing on activa-
tion. While both policies are intended to support youth
with complex needs throughout VET, none addresses the
selective nature of the market. The centrality of activa-
tion on a selective market does not allow for the very
disadvantaged to be reached: the most-disadvantaged
are either excluded from the target group (Case 2) or
strict eligibility criteria filters them out at the entrance
to the programme because of their low chances to suc-
ceed (Case 1). Second, a cream-skimming-inducing in-
centive structure leading to a Matthew effect was iden-
tified in the first case. Even though it seems crucial for
politico-administrative actors to contain a Matthew ef-
fect in in this policy field, the incentive structure driving
frontlineworkers to cream-skimwas deliberately embed-
ded in the policy design by politico-administrative actors.
This enabled attainment of politically satisfying results,
safeguarding political and thus financial support for the
measure. As both programmes represent last resortmea-
sures for disadvantaged youth, such Matthew effects
lead to particularly detrimental consequences, hamper-
ing educational access and outcomes for the individuals
in greatest need.
In both cases, a Matthew effect generally seems the
result of a political compromise: to invest in highly disad-
vantaged youth despite a cost-containment context yet
sacrificing themost-disadvantaged among themas appar-
ently too cost-intensive. As noted by Bonoli (2017, p. 70),
in times where political debates on the role of the state
are dominated by budgetary restrictions induced by de-
mographic aging, the credibility of the social investment
strategy depends on its ability to demonstrate that the
invested money produces returns. Indeed, as highlighted
by Nadai, from an economic perspective, investment
means the allocation of financial resources to realise
monetary gain. Investments are therefore always selec-
tive, with disposable resources being directed to where
biggest returns are foreseen (Nadai, 2017, pp. 80–81). To
understand how the resources are channelled, it is cru-
cial to know how returns are assessed, which is largely af-
fected by the rationale underlying the social investment
approach. Indeed, this concept is contended between dif-
ferent ideologies and interests. In terms of human capital
investments, central to the social investment approach
and to the present study, the underlying rationale can be
of more economistic or of more social nature, inspired
by the works of two highly different economists. First, a
more economistic rationale, emphasizes the need of hu-
man capital investments for economic growth by increas-
ing people’s production possibilities. Highly influenced
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by economist James Heckman, who highlights the eco-
nomic returns on investments in education (e.g., Heck-
man, 2006), this approach to social investment promotes
human capital investments with the aim of increasing in-
dividuals’ ‘employability’. This notion emphasizes the in-
dividual’s responsibility to become ‘employable’, while it
neglects the importance of the socio-economic context
into which individuals should integrate. Second, empha-
sising social returns from social investments, economist
Amartya Sen takes a broader approach to human capi-
tal. Highlighting the multifaceted contribution of educa-
tion to a person’s life, hemoves beyond economic growth
as an end in itself, and emphasises the increased free-
dom to shape one’s life which results from more educa-
tion. This approach to social investment goes beyond the
individual-centred notion of ‘employability’, highlights
the importance of the socio-economic contextual fram-
ing, and seeks a stronger role of the state to shape the
macroeconomic context to best accommodate the work-
force (Morel & Palme, 2017, pp. 150–153).
Both studied cases lean towards the first,
economistic social investment approach: the focus is
on converting the youth into more attractive appren-
ticeship-seekers, without interfering with the contextual
framework of a selective market. This focus on employa-
bility implies that returns on investments are expected in
activation terms. Consequently, the most-disadvantaged
youth, far removed from the market, will not be consid-
ered as individualsworth investing in, due to low chances
of returns on investment. If the emphasising were on so-
cial returns from human capital investments, returns
would be assessed in terms of employability skills as
a competence, in order to integrate on the long-term
the demanding labour market of the knowledge society
(Nadai, 2017, p. 80). The focus of the intervention would
then be re-centred on the youth in difficulty and, thus, al-
low complex needs to be addressed. This would allow for
value not only direct activation results, but also the nec-
essary intermediary steps, potentially leading to the final
activation objective, while improving the individuals’ ca-
pacity to shape their own life. If returns on investment
were assessed more generally, on the problems solved
through the given service, while improving the inclusivity
of the contextual framework, incidences of a Matthew
effect would likely decrease. However, although it has
been shown that net efficacy of education and training
investments are higher for the most-disadvantaged indi-
viduals (Card, 1999, as cited in Esping-Andersen, 2017;
Nicaise, 2000), in mature welfare states it seems that, to
deal with permanent austerity, key actors move from the
idealism of reaching out to the most-disadvantaged indi-
viduals, to the pragmatic, more cost-effective solution of
focusing on thosewho are easier to reinsert into themar-
ket. Consequently, the most vulnerable individuals are
subject to a vicious, further-marginalising cycle. Instead
of correcting for previous inequalities these youth may
have suffered (e.g., in school; Coradi Vellacott & Wolter,
2005), such policies risk increasing them.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the academic editors
of this thematic issue Inger Lise Skog Hansen and Tone
Fløtten, three anonymous reviewers, as well as Giuliano
Bonoli, Fabienne Liechti and Anna Wilson for their valu-
able input on earlier versions of this article.
Conflict of Interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
References
Amblard, H., Bernoux, P., Herreros, G., & Livian, Y. F.
(2005). Les nouvelles approches sociologiques des or-
ganisations [New sociological approaches to organi-
sations]. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. (Original work pub-
lished 1996)
Bell, D., & Blanchflower, D. (2010). Youth unemployment:
Déjà vu? (Working Paper no. 4705). Bonn: IZA DP.
Bonoli, G. (2013). The origins of active social policy:
Labour market and childcare policies in a compara-
tive perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bonoli, G. (2017). L’investissement social dans la poli-
tique sociale en Suisse [Social investment in Swiss so-
cial policy]. In J.-M. Bonvin & S. Dahmen (Eds.), Inve-
stir dans la protection social: Atouts et limites pour la
Suisse. Reformieren durch Investieren? Chancen und
Grenzen des Sozialinvestitionsstaats in der Schweiz
[Investing in social protection: Strengths and limita-
tions for Switzerland. To reform by investing? Oppor-
tunities and limitations of the social investment state
in Switzerland] (pp. 66–78). Zürich: Seismo Verlag.
Bonoli, G., & Champion, C. (2015). L’accès des familles
migrantes défavorisées à l’accueil collectif présco-
laire: Où et comment investir [The access of disadvan-
taged migrant families to collective preschool child-
care: Where and how to invest]? Lausanne: Bureau
cantonal pour l’intégration des étrangers et la préven-
tion du racisme.
Bonoli, G., Cantillon, B., & van Lancker, W. (2017). Social
investment and the Matthew effect: Limits to a strat-
egy. In A. Hemerijck (Ed.), The uses of social invest-
ment (pp. 66–76). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boston, J. (2013). Basic NPM ideas and their develop-
ment. In T. Christensen, & P. Laegreid (Eds.), The
Ashgate research companion to new public manage-
ment (pp. 17–32). Surrey: Ashgate Publishing. (Origi-
nal work published 2011)
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2013). Successful qualitative re-
search. A practical guide for beginners. London: SAGE
Publications.
Brodkin, E. (2012). Reflections on street-level bureau-
cracy: Past, present, and future. Public Administra-
tion Review, 72(November/December), 940–949.
Buffat, A. (2016). La bureaucratie de guichet ou les dé-
fis des contacts avec les usagers du service public
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 289–300 298
[Bureaucracy at the counter or the challenges of
public service users contacts]. In D. Giauque & Y.
Emery (Eds.), L’acteur et la bureaucratie au XXI siè-
cle [The actor and bureaucracy in the 21st century]
(pp. 141–167). Laval: Presses de l’Université Laval.
Camilleri-Cassar, F. (2013). Education strategy for social
inclusion or marginalising the marginalised? Journal
of Youth Studies, 17(2), 252–268.
Cantillon, B. (2011). The paradox of the social invest-
ment state: Growth, employment and poverty in the
Lisbon era. Journal of European Social Policy, 21(5),
432–449.
Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P. (2009). Introduction. In T.
Christensen & P. Laegreid (Eds.), Transcending new
public management. The transformation of public
sector reforms (pp. 1–16). Surrey: Ashgate Publishing.
(Original work published 2007)
Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P. (2013). Introduction. In
T. Christensen & P. Laegreid (Eds.), The Ashgate re-
search companion to new public management (pp.
1–13). Surrey: Ashgate Publishing. (Original work
published 2011)
Coradi Vellacott, M., & Wolter, S. C. (2005). L’égalité des
chances dans le système éducatif Suisse [Equality of
opportunities in the Swiss education system] (Rap-
port de tendance no. 9). Aarau: CSRE.
Crozier, M., & Friedberg, E. (2014). L’acteur et le système
[The actor and the system]. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
(Original work published 1977)
Deleeck, H. (1979). L’effet Matthieu [The Matthew ef-
fect]. Droit social, 11, 375–383.
Dent, M. (2005). Post-new public management in public
sector hospitals? The UK, Germany and Italy. Policy &
Politics, 33(4), 623–636.
Di Stasio, V. (2014). Education as a signal of trainability:
Results from a vignette study with Italian employers.
European Sociological Review, 30(6), 796–809.
Dif-Pradalier, M., Rosenstein, E., & Bonvin, J.-M. (2012).
Vocational training as an integration opportunity
for struggling young adults? A Swiss case study.
Social Work & Society, 10(1). Retrieved from
www.socwork.net/sws/article/view/303
Esping-Andersen, G. (2017). Chancengleichheit in einer
zunehmend feindlichen Welt [Equal opportunities
in an increasingly hostile world]. In J.-M. Bonvin &
S. Dahmen (Eds.), Investir dans la protection social:
Atouts et limites pour la Suisse. Reformieren durch
Investieren? Chancen und Grenzen des Sozialinvesti-
tionsstaats in der Schweiz [Investing in social pro-
tection: Strengths and limitations for Switzerland. To
reform by investing? Opportunities and limitations
of the social investment state in Switzerland] (pp.
19–65). Zürich: Seismo Verlag.
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of
grounded theory. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
Gomel, B., Issehnane, S., & Legendre, F. (2013).
L’accompagnement et les trajectoires d’insertion
des jeunes bénéficiaires d’un contrat d’insertion
dans la vie sociale [The accompaniment and the
insertion trajectories of youth benefitting from a
social insertion contract]. Travail et Emploi, 134,
5–20.
Häfeli, K., & Schellenberg, C. (2009). Facteurs de réus-
site dans la formation professionnelle des jeunes
à risque [Success factors in vocational training of
youth at risk] (Working Paper no. 29B). Bienne: EDK/
CDIP/CDPE/CDEP.
Heckman, J. J. (2006). Skill formation and the economics
of investing in disadvantaged children. Science, 312,
1900–1902.
Hupka, S., & Stalder, B. E. (2004). Achtung Gender. Aus-
bildungsverhalten von Mädchen und jungen Frauen:
Trends und Tipps [Attention gender. Training be-
haviour of girls and young women: Trends and
tips]. In Schweizerische Konferenz derGleichstellungs-
beauftragten (pp. 79–94). Bern.
Jun, J. S. (2009). The limits of post-new public man-
agement and beyond. Public Administration Review,
69(1), 161–165.
Liebig, T., Kohls, S., & Krause, K. (2012). The labour mar-
ket integration of immigrants and their children in
Switzerland (Working Paper no. 128). Paris: OECD
Publishing.
Lipsky, M. (2010). Street-level bureaucracy. Dilemmas of
the individual in public services. New York, NY: Russel
Sage Foundation. (Original work published 1980)
López Vilapana, C. (2013). Children were the age group
at the highest risk of poverty or social exclusion in
2011 (Population and social conditions Working Pa-
per no. 4). Luxembourg: Eurostat.
Meyer, T. (2009). Bildung: wer hat, dem wird gegeben
[Education: Those who have, will receive]. Uni NOVA,
Wissenschaftsmagazin der Universität Basel, 112,
10–11.
Morel, N., & Palme, J. (2017). A normative foundation
for the social investment approach? In A. Hemerijck
(Ed.), The uses of social investment (pp. 150–160). Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
Nadai, E. (2017). Investitionen in Ungleichheit [Invest-
ments in inequality]. In J.-M. Bonvin & S. Dahmen
(Eds.), Investir dans la protection social: Atouts et lim-
ites pour la Suisse. Reformieren durch Investieren?
Chancen und Grenzen des Sozialinvestitionsstaats in
der Schweiz [Investing in social protection: Strengths
and limitations for Switzerland. To reform by invest-
ing? Opportunities and limitations of the social in-
vestment state in Switzerland] (pp. 79–92). Zürich:
Seismo Verlag.
Nicaise, I. (2000). Formation des groupes défavorisés:
Dilemme équité-efficacité [Training of disadvantaged
groups: Equity-efficiency dilemma]? In V. Vanden-
berghe (Ed.), La formation professionnelle continue:
Transformations, contraintes et enjeux [Continu-
ous vocational training: Transformations, constraints
and implications] (pp. 151–162). Louvain-la-Neuve:
Academia Bruylant.
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 289–300 299
Nicaise, I., & Bollens, J. (1998). Training and employment
opportunities for disadvantaged persons. In Voca-
tional Education and Training. The European research
field. background report (pp. 121–155). Thessaloniki:
CEDEFOP.
Perriard, V. (2005). Transition de l’école obligatoire vers
la formation professionnelle: Les facteurs explicatifs
des difficultés actuelles. Analyse de littérature [Tran-
sition from compulsory to vocational education: The
explanatory factors of current difficulties. Literature
review]. Lausanne: Unité de Recherche pour le Pi-
lotage des Systèmes Pédagogiques.
Pisoni, D. (in press). Activating the most disadvan-
taged youth: Administratively too risky, politically too
costly? International Social Security Review.
Protsch, P., & Solga, H. (2015). How employers use sig-
nals of cognitive and non-cognitive skills at labour
market entry. Insights from field experiments. Euro-
pean Sociological Review, 31(5), 521–532.
Rankin, J., & Regan, S. (2004). Meeting complex needs:
The future of social care. London: Turning Point and
Institute of Public Policy Research.
Rosengard, A., Laing, I., Ridley, J., & Hunter, S. (2007). A
literature review on multiple and complex needs. Ed-
inburgh: Scottish Executive Social Research.
Salvisberg, A., & Sacchi, S. (2014). Labour market
prospects of Swiss career entrants after completion
of vocational education and training. European Soci-
eties, 16(2), 255–274.
Staatssekretariat für Bildung, Forschung und Innovation.
(2018). Berufsbildung in der Schweiz: Fakten und
Zahlen 2018 [Vocational education and training in
Switzerland: Facts and figures 2018]. Bern: SBFI.
Smith, S. R., & Lipsky, M. (1993). Nonprofits for hire. The
welfare state in the age of contracting. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Solga, H. (2015). A fault confessed is half redressed. Re-
view essay on low-achieving school leavers’ access
to apprenticeships and their returns to participation
in prevocational trainingmeasures (Discussion paper
no SP I 2015-501). Berlin: WZB Berlin Social Science
Centre.
Stalder, B. E. (2012). School-to-work transitions in
apprenticeship-based VET systems: The Swiss ap-
proach. In S. Billett, G. Johnson, S. Thomas, C. Sim, S.
Hay, & J. Ryan (Eds.), Experience of school transitions.
Policies, practice and participants (pp. 123–139). Dor-
drecht: Springer.
Van Lancker, W., & Ghysels, J. (2012). Who benefits? The
social distribution of subsidized childcare in Sweden
and Flanders. Acta Sociologica, 55(2), 125–142.
Yin, R. K. (2013). Case study research: Design and meth-
ods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. (Original
work published 2009)
About the Author
Delia Pisoni is finishing her PhD at the unit of social policies of the Swiss Graduate School of Public
Administration (IDHEAP) in Lausanne, Switzerland. In her dissertation she focuses on the Matthew
effect in vocational education and training programmes, and wishes to contribute to the general un-
derstanding of this effect in social policies. Her broader research interests include labourmarket access
for disadvantaged individuals, vocational education and training access for disadvantaged youth, social
work, and frontline practices.
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 289–300 300
